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Abstract 
We show that a quantum network can protect the identity of a sender and receiver from an 
external wiretapper. This new quantum communication protocol, which we call secure quantum 
routing, requires only single photons routed by linear optical elements and photon counters, and 
does not require distributing entanglement over multiple nodes or active feedforward. We prove 
that secure quantum routing protects both the contents of the message and the identity of the sender 
and receiver, and creates only a negligible reduction in the network channel capacity. 
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Quantum networks enable unconditionally secure communication guaranteed by laws of 
physics1. The majority of quantum communication protocols to-date focus on securing messages 
being transmitted from one point to another2-5. When many quantum channels combine to form a 
complex network, however, the secrecy of messages transmitted between individual parties 
represents only one aspect of security. In many cases, knowledge of who is talking to whom in a 
network can reveal critical information. This realization lies at the heart of network traffic analysis, 
which focuses on using the flow of network data to extract useful information6-9. 
Network traffic analysis can reveal patterns in communication that can be useful to adversaries. 
For example, adversaries can target a desired person in the network by keying on patterns in their 
communication. Large scale mining of meta-data can also serve as the basis for developing 
predictive models that provide global information about the network. The fields of machine 
learning10 and big data11 are rapidly devising new methods to extract useful information from large 
dataset. At the same time, methods to protect networks against such attacks constitute an important 
security loophole. 
Classical communication systems securitize network traffic flow based on packet reshuffling12-
15, shared randomness16, or global broadcasting17. These protocols provide computational security, 
but not unconditional information theoretic security. More recently, Broadbent and Tapp showed 
that pairwise unconditionally secure channels can enable information theoretic anonymous 
communication that protects the identities of senders and receivers18. This protocol, however, 
works only for transmissions of classical bits and require large communication overhead that 
occupies a significant fraction of the network channel capacity. Following this work, several 
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anonymous quantum protocols have been proposed with the ability to transmit quantum states with 
anonymity guaranteed by laws of physics19-26. However, these protocols all require establishing 
highly entangled Schrödinger cat states of the form ( )00 0 11 1 2ψ = +  , where all the 
nodes of the network constitute a single entangled quantum system. Such complex entangled states 
can only be created using a long-lived quantum memory and some degree of distributed quantum 
computation capabilities, which is beyond current technological capabilities. 
In this letter we demonstrate that a quantum network can protect the identity of senders and 
receivers from an external wiretapper without distributing complex Schrödinger cat states. We 
propose a protocol, which we denote secure quantum routing, that simultaneously protects the 
identity of a sender and receiver, as well as the content of the message from an eavesdropper that 
has access to all communication across the network. Implementation of the proposed protocol 
requires only efficient single photon sources and detectors along with linear optical elements, and 
does not require active feedforward. Therefore it can be implemented with currently available 
technological capabilities. Unlike anonymous communication, secure quantum routing does not 
protect the identity of the sender from the receiver. But it protects the identity of the sender and 
receiver from all third parties (including other nodes in the network), which protects the network 
from important security vulnerabilities such as traffic analysis. 
Figure 1(a) illustrates our general network and eavesdropping model. We consider a network 
composed of an arbitrary number of point-to-point links. Each link is composed of an authenticated 
classical channel along with a quantum channel that can transmit quantum bits such as single 
photons. As with standard quantum key distribution (QKD), each node in the network constitutes 
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a secure enclave where Eve cannot access or modify any of the equipment inside the node. The 
eavesdropper has access to all classical and quantum signals transmitted between the nodes for all 
time. We also assume that all the nodes can access a common clock to synchronize communication. 
 
 
FIG. 1. (Color online) (a) Illustration of general network model. The network is composed of 
quantum nodes connected by quantum channels with arbitrary connectivity. The eavesdropper has 
access to all communications transmitted between nodes over the entire network. (b) Detailed 
schematic of a single quantum link between two nodes implementing a Type 3 communication. The 
structure is composed of an interferometer where half of the photon wavepacket remains protected 
in node i, while the other transmits back and forth from node j. 
 
We represent a quantum transmission from node i to node j by the quantum state 
, ,i j n xψ = ⊗   , where , ,i j n   represents the spatial and temporal mode of the qubit 
propagating from node i to j on the n’th clock cycle, and x  is the qubit state. Eve can acquire 
information about the sender and receiver of the message in two possible ways. First, she can 
monitor the transmitted messages x  that may contain information about the sender and receiver’s 
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identity. Second, she can monitor the spatio-temporal mode , ,i j n  which identifies that the qubit 
travels from the transmitter node i to the receiver node j. To protect against both types of attacks, 
we subdivide communication over the network into three categories, Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 
time slots. We allocate Type 1 time slots for regular network communication, Type 2 time slots to 
prevent an eavesdropper from monitoring x , and Type 3 time slots to prevent an eavesdropper 
from monitoring the spatio-temporal mode ,i j . We will show that Type 2 and Type 3 time slots 
require only a small fraction of the total channel capacity.  
 
The protocol proceeds as follows:  
1. Prior to any network communication, all network nodes use standard QKD to exchange a 
secret message that tells which clock cycles are devoted to Type 2 and Type 3 
communications, along with all other information required to implement Type 2 and Type 
3 communications as described below. 
2. In Type 1 time slots, if node i wants to transmit a qubit x  to node j, it directly sends it 
over the quantum channel by preparing the state , ,i j n xψ = ⊗  . Physically, node i 
could prepare this qubit by generating a single photon and launching it at the appropriate 
time into a single mode fiber that connects to node j. After node j recognizes the receipt of 
the qubit, it sends a dummy qubit back to node i on the next clock cycle using the state 
, , 1j i n yψ ′ = +  where y  is a randomly prepared qubit. 
3. In Type 2 time slots, node i randomly prepares a message qubit x  in one of its two 
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eigenstates either using the basis { }0 , 1   or the basis { },+ −   where 
( )0 1 2± = ± . Node i transmits the prepared state to a randomly selected node j by 
preparing the state , ,i j n xψ = . Node j measures the message qubit in the same basis, 
and sends node i a random qubit y  on the next clock cycle. If node j fails to receive a 
packet or detects more than one packets from node i on the same clock cycle, it randomly 
generates a result.  
4. In Type 3 time slots, node i randomly prepares the qubit state in one of the following two 
states, 
 ( )1 , , , , ,
2
i i n i j n yψ ± = ±   (1) 
where node j is randomly selected in Step 1, and y  is a randomly generated qubit. The 
state , ,i i n  represents the case where node i generates a qubit and retains it within the 
node, rather than injecting into the network. The receiving node j directly sends its 
component of the packet ψ ±  back to node i on the next clock cycle. Node i then performs 
a measurement in the basis ( )1 , , 1 , , 1
2p
i i n j i n± = + ± +  , ignoring the state of the 
randomly prepared qubit y . If node i fails to receive a packet or detects multiple packets 
within a clock cycle, they randomly generate a result. Figure 1(b) shows a physical 
implementation of this step, where the packet is composed of a single photon split into a 
superposition of two modes.  
5. After a sufficient number of transmissions over the network, each node pair calculates the 
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Type 2 disturbance 2D , defined as the probability that node j measures a different qubit 
state than the one sent by node i, and the Type 3 disturbance 3D , defined as the probability 
that node i transmits state ψ ±  and eventually detects the state 
p
 . If either disturbance 
exceeds a threshold value, the network determines that a third party is eavesdropping and 
communication is discontinued. 
 
To understand how the protocol protects the message, we first note that Eve does not know 
which clock cycles belong to Type 1, 2, or 3 time slots. Thus, if she monitors the quantum 
transmission she will inevitably measure some Type 2 and Type 3 time slots. If Eve attacks the 
content of the message during a Type 2 time slot, she will induce a disturbance in a completely 
analogous way to the BB84 protocol5 because the communicating parties encode information in 
two non-orthogonal bases. If she instead performs a measurement on the spatio-temporal mode 
, ,i j n , she will induce disturbance during a Type 3 time slot by obtaining which-path information 
regarding whether the photon was transmitted to node j or remained in the secure enclave of node 
i. As shown in Fig. 1(b), this which-path information destroys the interference at node i once it 
receives the packet component back from node j. 
We now prove that an eavesdropper cannot obtain information about the message and data 
traffic flow without inducing Type 2 and Type 3 disturbances respectively. We first define the most 
general eavesdropping model allowed by quantum physics. When node i generates a quantum 
signal during a Type 1 time slot, the total state of the entire system, which includes Eve and the 
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entire network, is given by ntot Rψ ψ=  , where , ,i j n xψ =  is the state of the photonic 
packet and nR is the state of the external environment on the n’th clock cycle that includes Eve’s 
accessible Hilbert space, and the Hilbert space of all other nodes in the network which may or may 
not be exchanging quantum bits at the current clock cycle. This state can also depend on all 
communication history in the previous 1n −  clock cycles. The only assumption is that the qubit 
produced by node i at the current clock cycle n is not initially entangled with the external 
environment. This assumption is valid because the qubit is produced locally inside node i which is 
a secure enclave that cannot be accessed by Eve. 
Eve’s measurement is composed of a unitary operation that entangles the state of the 
transmitted qubit with the external environment. We represent this operation mathematically as 
( )n n nRφ ψ= U  , where nU  is a unitary operator that performs a general rotation in the Hilbert 
space spanned by ψ  and nR . At each time slot Eve may select an optimal unitary operator to 
maximize the information she could obtain. Note that this attack does not limit Eve to a local attack 
on the channel between node i and j, because state nR  contains all past information available to 
Eve, as well as the present state of all other nodes in the network. Thus, this eavesdropping model 
represents a general coherent attack where Eve can exploit all past classical and quantum 
information, as well as the state of the entire network, to optimize her attack strategy.  
 To prove security, we first consider the constraints on Eve’s unitary operator imposed by the 
requirement that she cannot induce a Type 2 disturbance. We expand the state using the spatio-
temporal basis , ,i j n  which enables us to express the state of the system as  
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 ( )
, ,
, , ,klmijn ntot
k l m
k l m x Rψ = ∑ U   (2) 
where k   and l   sum over all nodes in the network, m   sums over all clock cycles, and 
, , , ,klmijn k l m i j n=U U  is an operator that acts on the subspace spanned by the message qubit x  
and nR . In Supplementary Section 127, we show that Eve cannot change the spatial or temporal 
mode of the photon, or injecting a photon of her own into the network. Doing so would result in 
photons being detected in the wrong node or at the wrong time which would induce Type 2 
disturbance. In Eq. (2) these constraints are equivalent to the condition that klmijnU  is non-zero if and 
only if i k= , j l= , and n m= . Eq. (2) therefore simplifies to 
 ( ), , .ijn ntot i j n x Rψ = U   (3) 
where we use the simplified notation ijnijn ijn=U U .  
In Supplementary Section 227, we prove that Eve cannot obtain information about the message 
without inducing a Type 2 disturbance. The proof proceeds in an analogous way to the BB84 
protocol28. The reason for security is also the same as BB84. The sender encodes information in 
four non-orthogonal states, and any measurements on the system unavoidably induce a disturbance.  
Now we examine communications during Type 3 time slots. These time slots serve to check if 
the eavesdropper is monitoring the propagation mode of the packets. We begin with the initial state 
that node i prepares during a Type 3 time slot, denoted by ( )1 , , , ,
2
i i n i j n yψ ± = ± . Eve 
applies unitary operations on clock cycle n when node i sends node j the packet component 
, ,i j n y , and on clock cycle 1n +  when node j returns the packet component back to node i. 
Once the wavepacket re-enters the secure enclave of node i, the state of the whole wavefunction 
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is 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 11 , , 1 , , 1 .2 iin n ijn nii n ji ntot i i n R j i n Rψ
±
+ +
 = + ± + U U U U   (4) 
Because Eve cannot access the packet component within the enclave of node i, iin n=U V  where 
nV  is a unitary operator that is independent of node index i. To avoid Type 3 disturbance, the 
unitary operators must satisfy 
 ( ) 11 .ijn n nji n ++ =U U V V   (5) 
This condition must hold for all combinations of i and j.  
We now show that if Eve’s unitary operation satisfies the constraints in Eq. (5), she attains no 
information during Type 1 time slots regarding which node is sending or receiving packets. In Type 
1 communications, node i transmits a packet at clock cycle n given by the state , ,i j n x , and 
node j sends back a dummy packet , , 1j i n y+  to node i at clock cycle 1n + . The state of the 
whole environment upon Eve’s unitary operations is given by ( )11 ijn nji n Rψ += U U . If node i does 
not transmit a packet at clock cycle n, the state of the whole environment after clock cycle 1n +  
is given by 12 n n nRψ += V V  . According to Eq. (5), the state of the whole environment that 
includes Eve’s own accessible system are identical and does not depend on the spatial mode of the 
transmitted packet. Thus, Eve’s measurement results are independent whether node i sent a qubit 
or whether node j received a qubit. She cannot determine who is the sender or receiver of the 
packet, or even whether a packet was transmitted or not in the network.  
The above proof shows that Eve cannot obtain information about the network data or traffic 
flow without inducing disturbance. In the asymptotic limit the network will detect Eve no matter 
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how small of a disturbance she creates. But in a realistic network the length of communication is 
finite, so it is still possible for Eve to successfully attack the network without inducing disturbance. 
The network must assign sufficient number of Type 2 and Type 3 time slots to ensure that this 
probability is negligibly small, which results in a reduction in channel capacity. This reduction 
should be small in order for the protocol to be efficient. Furthermore, realistic networks will have 
a finite Type 2 and Type 3 disturbance even in the absence of eavesdropping. In the worst case, all 
disturbance must be attributed to eavesdropping and the network needs to estimate the amount of 
information that has been potentially leaked. 
In order to analyze the efficiency and security of the protocol for a realistic network in the 
presence of noise and loss, we consider a restricted set of eavesdropping attacks based on an 
intercept and re-send strategy. In this attack Eve intercepts a packet and measures either the 
propagation mode or the content of the message (or both). She then relays the measured packet to 
the intended receiver. For each packet where Eve measures the propagation mode, she learns 
complete information about the sender and receiver. We note that although this attack is not the 
most general attack, it still gives Eve complete access to the entire network simultaneously, which 
is extremely challenging using current technological capabilities.  
We first investigate the efficiency of the protocol. During Type 2 and Type 3 time slots a node 
pair cannot engage in normal network communication, which reduces the overall channel capacity. 
Furthermore, prior to the protocol the network must exchange additional information such as 
which clock cycles constitute Type 2 and Type 3 communications and who are the receivers and 
senders, and after the protocol the network must exchange measurement results in each Type 2 and 
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Type 3 communication slots to calculate disturbance. These communications further degrade the 
total channel capacity. We define the overhead H as the average number of bits transmitted per 
node pair prior to network communication, during Type 2 and Type 3 time slots, and after 
communication to calculate disturbance. We calculate H for a network with K communication time 
slots. In Supplementary Section 3 we show that ( )logH O K= 27, which scales logarithmically with 
the number of communication time slots, demonstrating that the protocol is efficient.  
We next consider the security of the protocol in the presence of finite Type 2 and Type 3 
disturbance. We focus on the case where Eve aims to obtain the information about the network 
traffic flow, not the message. The analysis of the message security has already been extensively 
studied for QKD protocols29, and these results are applicable to our protocol as well. If Eve 
intercepts a fraction η  of the total communication clock cycles, she learns the identity of the 
sender and receiver for a fraction η   of the transmitted bits, but she also induces a Type 3 
disturbance of 2D η=  . This information disturbance tradeoff enables us to calculate the 
maximum amount of information leaked to Eve given a measured disturbance. 
A realistic network will have a baseline disturbance level due to losses and measurement error. 
The disturbance for the link between node i and node j is ( )1 2ij ij ij ji ij jiD T T T Tγ= + − , where ijγ  is 
the baseline error probability of the interference measurement due to finite visibility of the 
interferometer, and ijT  is the probability that a photon successfully transmits from node i to node 
j . In the following analysis, we assume that ijT  and ijγ  are identical for all channels in the network 
so that we can denote ijD , ijT  and ijγ  as D , T  and γ  respectively. 
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To achieve error-free communication, a sender must transmit a message [ ],M A E= , where A 
is the actual message and E is additional information required to perform error correction. The 
total error probability of the communication is given by ( )1 2e T Tµ= + −  , where µ   is the 
baseline error probability for the communication channel. An error correction algorithm operating 
at the Shannon limit requires the length of M to be ( )( )1L h e+ , where L is the length of A and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )log 1 log 1h e e e e e= − − − −  . Thus, the fraction of network traffic flow information 
obtained by an eavesdropper is given by 
 ( )( ){ }max 1, 2 1 .g D h e= +   (6) 
Figure 2 plots the fraction of network traffic flow information obtained by an eavesdropper as a 
function of channel loss (in dB), where we set 0.01γ =  and 0.01µ = . The fraction of network 
traffic flow information that Eve could obtain increases monotonically with respect to channel 
losses, because losses create Type 3 disturbance even in the absence of eavesdropping. The 
communication protocol can withstand 1.9 dB loss before the whole network traffic flow 
information is revealed to an eavesdropper. 
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Fraction of network traffic flow information obtained by an eavesdropper as 
a function of photon loss (in dB). The grey region represents the regime where traffic flow is 
completely revealed to an eavesdropper. 
 
In summary, we demonstrate that a quantum network capable of exchanging qubits can protect 
the network traffic flow information from an external eavesdropper without distributing highly 
entangled states of many nodes. This information is not limited to the identities of the sender and 
receiver of each transmitted packet. It also protects global properties of the network. For example, 
the eavesdropper cannot distinguish a silent network from one that is transmitting many packets. 
The dominant mechanism for degraded security is channel loss. An important open question is 
whether better algorithms exist that can handle loss more efficiently. Another important question 
is how to incorporate classical reconciliation into secure quantum routing in order to more 
efficiently handle the security of the message. In general, our protocol provides compelling 
approach to extend conventional point to point quantum communication to more complex network 
settings to attain quantum advantages over classical networks. 
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Figure Captions 
FIG. 1 (Color online) (a) Illustration of general network model. The network is composed of 
quantum nodes connected by quantum channels with arbitrary connectivity. The eavesdropper has 
access to all communications transmitted between nodes over the entire network. (b) Detailed 
schematic of a single quantum link between two nodes implementing a Type 3 communication. 
The structure is composed of an interferometer where half of the photon wavepacket remains 
protected in node i, while the other transmits back and forth from node j. 
FIG. 2. (Color online) Fraction of network traffic flow information obtained by an eavesdropper 
as a function of photon loss (in dB). The grey region represents the regime where traffic flow is 
completely revealed to an eavesdropper. 
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Supplementary Materials 
Secure quantum routing 
Shuo Sun and Edo Waks 
 
1. Security proof that Eve cannot change the spatial or temporal mode of the photon 
We show that Eve cannot change the spatial or temporal mode of the photon, or injecting a 
photon of her own into the network. We note that in order to avoid inducing Type 2 disturbance, 
Eve must ensure that node j receives the packet sent by node i. If Eve diverts the packet to 
another node or to the same node at a different clock cycle, node j will fail to receive a qubit at 
the correct clock cycle which induces Type 2 disturbance with a probability of 0.5. Using our 
notation, this restriction means that Eve’s unitary operator cannot transform mode , ,i j n  to 
another mode , ,k l m  or retain it within her own system. Furthermore, Eve cannot inject 
additional photons into the mode , ,i j n  because node j will detect multiple packets, which also 
induces Type 2 disturbance with a probability of 0.51,2. Finally, Eve cannot exchange the packet 
in the mode , ,i j n  with a different one from another part of the network or from her own 
system. This action will clearly induce Type 2 disturbance because the messages transmitted in 
other packets in the network have no correlation with the qubit component sent from node i to j 
during a Type 2 time slot. In Eq. (2) of the main manuscript, these constraints are equivalent to 
the condition that klmijnU  is non-zero if and only if i k= , j l= , and n m= . Eq. (2) therefore 
simplifies to Eq. (3) in the main manuscript. 
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2. Security proof that Eve cannot obtain information about transmitted message 
We show that Eve cannot obtain information about the message without inducing a Type 2 
disturbance. The proof proceeds in an analogous way to the BB84 protocol3. During a Type 2 
time slot node i randomly prepares the qubit state x  either in the states { }0 , 1  or { },+ − . 
Using the first basis, we can expand Eve’s unitary operator as  
 ( ) 00 100 0 1 ,ijn n ijn n ijn nR R R= +U U U   (S1) 
 ( ) 01 111 0 1 ,ijn n ijn n ijn nR R R= +U U U   (S2) 
where abijn ijna b=U U . Eve cannot flip the state of the message qubit since this operation will 
lead to Type 2 disturbance, which means 01 10ijn ijn= =U U 0 . If node i instead uses the second basis to 
prepare the qubit x , the final state becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( )00 11 00 111 .
2ijn n ijn ijn ijn ijn n
R R ± = + ± + − U U U U U   (S3) 
To avoid Type 2 disturbance in this basis requires 00 11ijn ijn=U U . Thus, the final state of the system 
is ( ), , ijn ntot i j n x Rψ = U  where the unitary operator ijnU  does not depend on the state of 
the message qubit. Because Eve’s probe is completely disentangled from the message qubit, her 
measurement results are uncorrelated with the qubit state and she gains no information about the 
message. We note that in principle ijnU  could apply a constant qubit-independent rotation on the 
message Hilbert space, but such a rotation merely constitutes a change in Eve’s measurement 
basis. Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that the unitary operators ijnU  only 
operate on nR  not on x  . 
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3. Calculation of communication overhead 
Let ( )P η  be the probability that Eve intercepts a fraction η  of the total communication slots 
between any two nodes without causing any disturbance. We prove that, for any constant ε  such 
that 0 1ε< < , and any constant maxη  such that max0 1η< < , there exist constant numbers 0g  and 
1g  which are independent of K , such that if ( )1 0logH g K g= +  then ( )limK P η ε→∞ <  is satisfied 
for any maxη η> . This statement shows that, for an arbitrarily small maxη  and ε , we can always 
find constant numbers 0g  and 1g  such that the probability that Eve intercepts more than a 
fraction maxη  of the total communication slots without inducing disturbance is smaller than ε .  
Thus, the required overhead scales only logarithmically with the number of total communication 
slots.  
To prove this statement, we write H  as 1 2 3 4H H H H H= + + + , where 1H  is the 
number of exchanged bits between two nodes in the first step of the protocol, 2H  and 3H  is the 
number of exchanged bits (qubits) between two nodes during Type 2 and Type 3 time slots 
respectively, and 4H  is the number of exchanged bits between two nodes in the last step of the 
protocol for calculating the disturbance.  
 
Theorem 1. ( )1 2 3log 1 logH H K H K= ⋅ + + ⋅ . 
Proof. In the first step of the protocol, each node in the network must know when to send or 
receive a Type 2 and Type 3 packet from another node. Since it takes log K  bits to specify one 
time slot within K  time slots, this step takes ( )2 3 logH H K+ ⋅  bits. For each Type 2 packet, the 
sender and receiver also needs to know the basis to prepare and measure the message qubit. 
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Since it takes 1 bit to specify the basis for each Type 2 packet, this step takes a total number of 
2H  bits. We therefore obtain that ( )1 2 3log 1 logH H K H K= ⋅ + + ⋅ . 
 
Theorem 2. 4 2 3H H H= + . 
Proof. In the last step of the protocol, each node pair in the network exchanges the measured 
result for each Type 2 and Type 3 packet. Since it takes 1 bit to specify the outcome of the 
measurement, this step takes 2 3H H+  bits. We therefore obtain that 4 2 3H H H= + . 
 
 The following Lemma is necessary for the proof of Theorem 3. 
Lemma 1. Suppose Eve intercepts a fraction η  of the total communication slots between node i 
and node j and measures the propagation mode of each intercepted packet. The probability ( )P η  
that Eve does not induce any Type 3 disturbance satisfies ( ) ( )
3 3
2 1
K
K H HP
K K
η
η
η
 −
< +  − 
. 
Proof. We consider the case where 3H Kη <  and 3H Kη ≥  separately. In the case where 
3H Kη < , We can write P  as 
 
0
,
K
m
m
P P
η
=
= ∑   (S4) 
where mP  represents the probability that Eve does not induce any Type 3 disturbance even when 
she intercepts m  Type 3 time slots. The expression of mP  is given by 
 
3 0
1 .
2
m
m
H H
m K m
P
K
K
η
η
   
×   −     = ×    
 
 
  (S5) 
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where 0 3H K H= − . We can rewrite mP  as  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 3 3 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 .
1 1 2
m
m
K H H H m H H H K m
P
m K K K K
η η
η
⋅ − − + × ⋅ − − + +   = × ×   ⋅ − − +   
 

  (S6) 
Using the identity 
x a x
y a y
−
<
−
 for 0y x a> > > , we obtain that  
 
( )
0 3 .
2
mK m
m
K H HP
m K K K
ηη
η
−     < × ×      −    
  (S7) 
Substituting Eq. (S7) into Eq. (S4), we obtain that 
 ( )
3 3 .
2 1
K
K H HP
K K
η
η
 −
< +  − 
  (S8) 
In the case where 3H Kη ≥ , we can write P  as 
 
3
0 0
,
H K
m m
m m
P P P
η
= =
= ≤∑ ∑   (S9) 
where mP  still satisfies Eq. (S7). Substituting Eq. (S7) into Eq. (S9), we obtain Eq. (S8) again, 
which completes the proof. 
 
Lemma 2. If ( )1 3,P H aη < , then ( )2 3,P H aη <  as long as 1 20 1η η< ≤ < . 
Proof. For the same number of Type 3 time slots, the probability that Eve does not get detected 
would drop if Eve intercepts more packets. Therefore we have ( ) ( )2 3 1 3, ,P H P H aη η≤ <  for 
2 1η η≥ . 
 
Theorem 3. Let ( )P η  be the probability that Eve intercepts a fraction η  of the total 
communication slots without causing any disturbance. For any constant ε  such that 0 1ε< < , 
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and any constant maxη  such that max0 1η< < , there exists a constant number α  which is 
independent of K , such that if 3H α=  then ( )limK P η ε→∞ <  is satisfied for any maxη η> . 
Proof. Using Lemma 1, we obtain that 
 ( ) ( )
( )
( )
max 3 max3 3
max
max max
1 2
lim lim exp .
2 1 2 1
K
K K
HK H HP
K K
η
η η
η
η η→∞ →∞
   −−
< + = −      − −   
  (S10) 
For any η  that satisfies maxη η> , using Lemma 2, we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
max
max max0,
lim lim lim
K K K
P P P
η
η η η
→∞ →∞ → →∞
< ≤   (S11) 
Substituting Eq. (S10) into Eq. (S11), we obtain that 
 ( ) max 3
1lim exp .
2K
P Hη η
→∞
 < − 
 
  (S12) 
We let 
max
2 1lnα
η ε
 =  
 
, which is independent of K . It is straightforward to verify that when 
3H α= , then ( )limK P η ε→∞ < . 
 
Theorem 4. Let ( )P η  be the probability that Eve measures the message qubit state for a fraction 
η  of the total transmitted packets without causing any disturbance. For any constant ε  such that 
0 1ε< < , and any constant maxη  such that max0 1η< < , there exists a constant number β  which 
is independent of K , such that if 2H β=  then ( )limK P η ε→∞ <  is satisfied for any maxη η> . 
Proof. This proof follows the same procedure as the proof for Theorem 3.  
 
Finally, by combining Theorem 1-4 and the definition of H , we obtain that 
( ) ( )log 2H Kα β α β= + + + . Setting 0 2g α β= +  and 1g α β= +  completes the proof.  
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